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ARE HUMAN BEINGS RELIGIOUS BY NATURE?*
Schleiermacher's Generic View of Religion
and the Contemporary Pluralistic, Secular Culture
Wessel Stoker
1. The Problem
Schleiermacher defends the importance of religion and church for society. In his 
philosophy of culture, he claims that, next to other institutions like the family, the 
state, science and next to hospitality and friendship, the church is indispensable to 
society (E1812/13, III, 7-262).1 He argued, over against the intellectuals of his time, in 
his Über die Religion that religion belongs to human nature: “Everything that belongs 
to the true life of humankind and what should be a continually living and active 
impulse in them must, however, come from the most inward part of the spirit itself. 
Religion is something like that. It subjects everything to itself and shapes all action and 
thought to a theme of its heavenly power of imagination” (139; 37). In his theological 
encyclopedia he presents us with the idea that if religious communities are not to be 
considered mistakes, their existence “must be seen as a necessary element for the 
                                               
     * This article was read as a paper at the 12th Biennial European Conference on the 
Philosophy of Religion, Hofgeismar (27-30 August, 1998).
     1 Schleiermacher's works will be cited in abbreviated form as follows: Über die Religion
(1799), ed. R. Otto (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1920 (= ÜR); Ethik 1812/13:  
Einleitung und Güterlehre, Schleiermachers Werke II, ed. O. Braun (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 
1927) (= E1812/13); Ethik 1814/16,  Schleiermachers Werke, ed. O. Braun (= E1814/16); 
Dialektik (1814/15), ed. A. Arndt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988 (= D1814/15); Dialektik
(1822), ed. R. Odebrecht (Darmstadt: WB, 1976) (= DO); Kurze Darstellung des 
theologischen Studiums ... (1830), ed. H. Scholz (Darmstadt: WB, 1993) (= KD); Psychologie, 
Sämmtliche Werke III/6, ed. L. George Berlin: G. Reimer, 1862 (= PS); Der christliche 
Glaube I (1830), ed. M. Redeker, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960). In this case I will be using the 
English translation The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S. Stewart (Edinburgh: 
T.&T. Clark, 1968) (= CF). Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers following the 
abbreviations refer to the paragraph number in question.
1development of the human spirit” (KD 22). It is precisely with this that the aspect of 
the philosophy of culture in the introduction of The Christian Faith begins. In order 
to show the entire unique identity of the church, he refers to its basis: piety is essential 
for human beings. Human beings are religious beings. Given that, according to 
Schleiermacher, the human being is always a human being in community, the 
necessity of a religious community is thereby displayed (CF6). Religion is not 
coincidental or an accident but belongs to the essence of humanity. In 
Schleiermacher's view, the feeling of absolute dependence or God-consciousness 
belongs to human nature.
I would like to discuss Schleiermacher's view of religion in the context of our 
contemporary pluralistic culture. It can be asked if one does justice to Schleiermacher 
if his view of religion is discussed in light of a different culture than that of Prussia at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century in which Protestantism was dominant. In the 
Europe of our time Christianity is one of the many world religions among new 
religious movements and secular worldviews such as humanism, Marxism, 
nationalism and, in the Netherlands at least, a growing number of people who do not 
opt for any particular available worldview but have themselves constructed an 
orientation for their lives, composed of fragments of  the reigning values and norms in 
society. Keeping Schleiermacher's own cultural situation in mind, it seems possible  to 
investigate his generic view of religion with an eye for contemporary pluralistic, secular 
Western culture. Therefore our discussion will also include the views of some 
contemporary writers who also defend a generic view of religion.
When Schleiermacher states that religion is generic, that it belongs to the genus 
of humankind, what should we understand by religion? In the first place, 
Schleiermacher views religion as piety, as religiosity. He makes this clear by indicating 
the essence of piety in The Christian Faith as a feeling of absolute dependence or as 
God-consciousness. This raises the question of how, on the basis of this generic view 
of religion, the phenomenon of indifference to religion is to be interpreted. The 
situation is at present more urgent than in Schleiermacher's time since many people 
now appear to have no need for religion and that secular worldviews now exist 
alongside religions. Is this not in conflict with a generic concept of religion?
In the second place, Schleiermacher also views religion as organized religion, as 
empirically describable religious communities of Catholics and Protestants and as a 
way of referring to the world religions (CF6 Postscript). This second meaning of 
religion is closely connected with the first, because Schleiermacher, as we will see, 
does not view religion in an intellectual way but in terms of the experience of the 
human heart from which it emerges.2
                                               
     2 “The tendency of the human mind in general to give rise to religious emotions, always 
considered, however, along with their expression, and thus with the striving for fellowship, i.e.
the possibility of particular religions ...” (CF6.Postscript). Schleiermacher uses yet a third 
definition for religion: religion in general as an irreducible phenomenon over against other 
1If the essence of piety is the feeling of absolute dependence or God-
consciousness, do (the adherents of) non-monotheistic religions also fall under this 
concept of religion? For Schleiermacher, the term non-monotheistic religion referred 
primarily to polytheism and fetishism (2.2). According to him, one could hardly speak 
of a feeling of absolute dependence in these religions. With respect to Buddhism, his 
description of religion is problematic. Many Buddhists would find it difficult to 
recognize themselves in this description of the essence of religion (3.1).
I will discuss Schleiermacher's generic view of religion or piety primarily in the 
light of contemporary Western society which is to some extent indifferent to religion 
(2). In connection with this, we will also discuss the question of how the generic 
element, the feeling of absolute dependence, functions with respect to other religions 
(2.2). We will explore the question of whether the objections I will cite (in what 
follows) against the generic view of religion can be met by contemporary writers who, 
sharing Schleiermacher's intention, defend a generic view of religion (3). Like 
Schleiermacher, I also maintain that religion is indispensable for society. Given that a 
generic view of religion appears to be problematic for today's society, I will suggest a 
different way of understanding the generic element (4).
Schleiermacher worked out his view of religion primarily in his Über die 
Religion (1799) and later in the introduction to The Christian Faith (1821/22). I will 
limit myself to the view of religion found in the later Schleiermacher as expressed in 
the introductory section to the second edition of The Christian Faith (1830).
2. The Human Being as a Religious Being
2.1. The Essence of Piety: The Feeling of Absolute Dependence
Schleiermacher searches for access to the phenomenon of religion not via the 
institution of the church or via doctrine but via the human being as person. The place
of piety is not Knowing or Doing but immediate self-consciousness or Feeling. The 
essence of piety is the feeling of absolute dependence or, in other words, that we are 
conscious of being in relation to God. I will first discuss the place of piety.
Schleiermacher follows Kant insofar as he also holds that the transcendent 
ground of human beings and the world cannot be known. The unconditional cannot 
be comprehended by the conditional. We do not arrive at the transcendent ground 
via our thinking and willing. Without going into the line of thought in the Dialektik I 
will point only to the result of this for his views on religion.
Thinking has its limits and, although one can pose the question of the 
transcendental3—the unity of reality—at those limits, the transcendental itself lies 
                                                                                                                                  
phenomena like science or morality—piety as a modification of the feeling of immediate 
consciousness (CF3).
     3 In Schleiermacher the term transcendental means: 1. that which cannot be thought or 
1outside the boundaries of thought. Willing, too, can only pose the question of the 
transcendental. Schleiermacher searches for the point where the difference between 
knowing and willing is sublimated, a point that he finds in the immediate self-
consciousness or feeling. In feeling we ‘have' the transcendental in an immediate way 
that is not possible in thinking or willing. In feeling, as a condition of the unity of 
thinking and willing, we have the “analogy with the transcendent ground” (DO289). 
Schleiermacher often simply equates the transcendental or the transcendent ground 
with ‘God': “God is ... given to us as part of our essence” (D1814/15 216.2).4 He calls 
the God-consciousness the religious element of our immediate self-consciousness. 
Religious expressions arise on the basis of this element of our self-consciousness.
We should distinguish the immediate self-consciousness from the reflexive self-
consciousness in which the human being itself has become the object (DO288). The 
immediate self-consciousness or feeling is our pre-reflexive consciousness of our 
existence in the sense of a unity. Feeling does not refer to something subjective but to 
“the universal form of having oneself” (DO288).
In the prolegomena to The Christian Faith5 Schleiermacher returns to  the 
immediate self-consciousness of feeling and explains its religious aspect (3).6 Feeling is 
the “immediate presence of whole undivided Being” (3.2) in distinction from 
‘Knowing' and ‘Doing'. It is the place where our feeling is most internalized into a 
fundamental feeling like joy or grief (3.2).
Schleiermacher speaks not only of the feeling of absolute dependence but also 
of the feeling of partial dependence and a feeling of partial freedom, which are also to 
be found in immediate self-consciousness. This distinction between the feeling of 
partial dependence and partial freedom is crucial for understanding Schleiermacher's 
concept of the feeling of absolute dependence. We will therefore look at what he 
means by these two terms and how he connects them with the feeling of absolute 
dependence.
How do we feel dependent upon God in the core of our existence? In this 
connection there is an important fundamental distinction in human consciousness 
that Schleiermacher employs: receptivity and spontaneity (PS, pp. 501, 15f.; 532, 13f.; 
CF4.1). Submission and doing, receptivity and activity characterize the fundamental 
                                                                                                                                  
known (this is often what the term ‘transcendent' means in philosophy as well); 2. the condition 
for or the basis of thinking (and willing). Schleiermacher himself does not wish to make any 
distinction between ‘transcendent' and ‘transcendental'. Cf. L. Oranje God en wereld. De vraag 
naar het transcendentale in Schleiermachers ‘Dialektik' (Kampen: Kok, 1968), p. 87.
     4 Oranje, God en wereld, pp. 180ff.
     5 The numbers in the text refer, unless otherwise indicated, to the paragraphs of this work.
     6 “The piety ... is considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a 
modification of Feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness” (3).
1structure of human beings. Sometimes we are passive and at other times active, 
depending on whether the initiative comes from outside or from within ourselves. He 
formulates this distinction in paragraph 4.1 somewhat differently as “a self-caused 
element” (ein Sichselbstsetzen) and “a non-self-caused element” (ein 
Sichselbstnichtsogesetzthaben). From the latter it appears that the self-consciousness is 
as it is through dependence on something outside of myself. Existence is not only task 
but also gift. We are born into a particular culture and during our lives we appear to 
be continually dependent upon others. Thus, by speaking about “a non-self-caused 
element,” Schleiermacher explains receptivity as dependence, which in itself is not to 
be considered as identical to dependence.7 How is this dependence related to our 
freedom?
Our feeling of dependence expresses the fact that we are influenced by that 
which differs from us and our feeling of freedom expresses the fact that we influence 
that which differs from us (4.2). With this feeling of dependence and freedom the 
human subject stands within this reciprocity with other human beings and the world
(4.2; PS, p. 66). With respect to receptivity it is the other that is the active pole that 
works on us, whereas with respect to activity the other is the passive pole on which we 
work. Thus self-consciousness stands over against humans and things partly in a 
relative freedom from and partly in a partial dependence on them. There is no 
absolute dependence nor absolute freedom in our relation with the world, nature and 
society. Our freedom finds its limit in our dependence and our dependence in our 
freedom. The kind of relation determines which pole will have the upper hand. In his 
social philosophy Schleiermacher shows how this reciprocity of partial dependence 
and partial freedom is determinative for social relationships.8 Thus dependence is 
dominant in the relation of citizens to the government or of children to parents 
(4.2/3).
Decisive for Schleiermacher is the experiential fact that the sequence
dependence/freedom is at the same time hierarchical, because dependence is 
primary. We cannot conceive of ourselves without others and the other. Our activity 
is always dependent on an object on which it wants to exercise influence. Even when 
we are active, one can always point to a previous moment of receptivity which 
determines the direction of the original activity (4.1). Absolute freedom is therefore 
impossible.
How, in our partial dependence and partial freedom, do we now stand in a 
relation of absolute dependence on God? Absolute freedom, as stated above, was not 
                                               
     7 “The common element in all those determinations of self-consciousness which 
predominantly express a receptivity affected from some outside quarter is the feeling of 
Dependence” (4.2).
     8 Y. Spiegel, Theologie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1968), 
ch. 2.
1possible, but is absolute dependence possible? It is not possible if we are talking here 
of dependence on an object, for that can always be influenced by our action. Partial 
dependence finds its boundary in partial freedom. That from which the human being 
receives her life and on which she is entirely dependent can, in other words, not be 
the world (32.2). We can only feel absolutely dependent upon God. Feeling 
absolutely dependent is, according to Schleiermacher, nothing else than our 
conscious relation to God: “The Whence of our receptive and active existence, as 
implied in this self-consciousness, is to be designated by the word ‘God'” (4.4).
How is this God-consciousness to be understood? As we will see, it concerns a 
transcendental-phenomenological description of religious experience. Schleiermacher 
seems to suggest that on the basis of the negation of an absolute feeling of freedom 
one can conclude only one other possibility, i.e. absolute dependence. He states the 
following in a very obscure way:
But the self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, 
since that is never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives 
absolute freedom, is itself precisely a consciousness of absolute depen-
dency; for it is the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity 
comes from a source outside of us in just the same sense in which anything 
towards which we should have a feeling of absolute freedom must have 
proceeded entirely from ourselves. But without any feeling of freedom a 
feeling of absolute dependence would not be possible. (4.3)
One could ask whether the negation of the feeling of absolute freedom leads in fact to 
the feeling of absolute dependence. One can point to a third possibility: the feeling of 
partial freedom connected with the feeling of partial dependence. The negation of 
absolute freedom does not mean that our total activity is completely dependent on a 
source outside of ourselves but only that we can never transcend our situation of 
partial freedom and partial dependence.9
Logically, this is correct but one then goes beyond Schleiermacher's intention. 
The starting point for him is, as stated above, the experience that receptivity is 
primary over against activity (4.1).10 The decisive point is therefore not so much, as 
Jorgensen correctly remarks, the negation of absolute freedom in itself but the 
                                               
     9 Cf. K. Heim, Das Gewissheitsproblem in der systematischen Theologie bis zu 
Schleiermacher (Leipzig, 1911), p. 370.
     10 “But as we never do exist except along with an Other, so even in every outward-tending 
self-consciousness the element of receptivity, in some way or other affected, is the primary one; 
and even the self-consciousness which accompanies an action ..., while it predominantly 
expresses spontaneous movement and activity, is always related ... to a prior moment of 
affective  receptivity, through which the original ‘agility' received its direction” (4.1).
1irreversible order of partial dependence and partial freedom from which this negation 
of absolute freedom emerges and which makes one conscious of the essential 
receptivity of existence as absolute dependence.11
In paragraphs three and four Schleiermacher analyses immediate self-
consciousness in a transcendental-phenomenological way as absolutely dependent.12
It concerns the generic structure of the religious consciousness that is arrived at by 
abstracting from the concrete God-consciousness of the believer. Schleiermacher 
describes God-consciousness as absolutely dependent in connection with the feeling 
of freedom. The self-consciousness encounters free activity as a given. One should 
note the final sentence of the quote above: “But without any feeling of freedom a fee-
ling of absolute dependence would not be possible.” In combination with the primary 
experience of dependence free activity refers to absolute dependence. The feeling of 
absolute dependence thus expresses our consciousness of finitude (5.1; 8.2; 33).13
The issue here is an original experience beyond or behind which one cannot go. 
It is a fundamental experience that is given to us as a revelation: “God is given to us in 
feeling in an original way” (4.4). The feeling of absolute dependence and the 
immediate self-consciousness that becomes God-consciousness is an “original 
revelation of God to man or in man” (4.4).
The way in which Schleiermacher postulates God-consciousness gives rise to several 
questions.14 One question especially merits our attention with respect to our topic: is 
the essence of piety, the feeling of absolute dependence, Schleiermacher's definition 
of religion? In seeking the answer to this question we will see how religion as piety 
and as institutionalized cohere closely together.
If piety is viewed merely as the possession of a feeling of absolute dependence, 
                                               
     11 T.H. Jorgensen, Das religionsphilosophische Offenbarungsverständnis  des späteren 
Schleiermacher (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1977), pp. 216f.
     12 Proudfoot incorrectly produces a contradiction when he states: “In fact, Schleiermacher's 
characterization of the feeling more nearly resembles a transcendental version of the 
cosmological argument than an attempt to direct the reader to a particular aspect of experien-
ce” (W. Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley, etc.: University of California Press, 1985), 
p. 19). Schleiermacher is indeed concerned to describe the religious experience in such a way. 
Cf. R.R. Williams, Schleiermacher the Theologian (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), ch. 1.
     13 We can see how Hegel's objection to Schleiermacher's religious feeling, i.e. that it would be 
exclusively a matter of absolute dependence and that therefore “a dog would be the best 
Christian,” is unjustified (cf. G.W. Hegel, “Vorrede zu Hinrichs ‘Religionsphilosophie'” 
Sämmtliche Werke (Stuttgart, 1958, pp. 19, 20). It is precisely in connection with his own 
partial freedom that the human being experiences his absolute dependence.
     14 Such as, for example, the question of the relation of this experience of God with language 
and the question of whether one can speak here of immediate experience.
1one ends up with a distorted image of what Schleiermacher intends by his generic 
view of religion, the human being as a religious being. The image that he sketches of 
the religious human being and of religion as organized religion is more complex. In 
paragraphs three and four that we just discussed he discusses piety in the abstract, 
whereas paragraphs five and six, albeit in general terms, take up the believer and 
organized religion in the practice of everyday life. In everyday life the feeling of 
absolute dependence functions continually in connection with sensible self-
consciousness (5) and with our life within a religious community (6). And the religious 
community is always an historically determined community: Jewish, Christian, 
Islamic, etc. For our understanding of Schleiermacher's view of religion as generic this 
is important in the following way.
We are not conscious of the feeling of absolute dependence in itself but 
continually in connection with our existence in the world which is characterized by 
‘antithesis' (5.3).15 The antithesis is transcended in the feeling of absolute dependence, 
the relation to God (5.1; 4.4). Therefore Schleiermacher speaks of the feeling of 
absolute dependence as something that is continually self-identical or the same, 
whereas the difference in piety arises through the feeling of absolute dependence 
being joined with a continually changing sensible consciousness (5.4) characterized by 
antitheses. The expression that the human being is a religious being should not be 
understood in a static way on the basis, for example, of the doctrine of innate ideas. 
He views it in a dynamic way by distinguishing grades of religiosity:  “And the more 
the subject, in each moment of sensible self-consciousness, with his partial freedom 
and partial dependence, takes at the same time the attitude of absolute dependence, 
the more religious is he” (5.3). If pious self-consciousness is called an “essential 
element in human nature” it is an ontological statement that leaves open the ontic 
question of the extent to which that can be realized by the individual human being. 
Thus Schleiermacher describes the feeling of absolute dependence as a tendency that 
can break through into the human being: “the tendency which we have described, as 
an original and innate tendency of the human soul, strives from the very beginning to 
break through into consciousness” (5.3). This breaking through cannot succeed on 
the level of the confused animal grade of self-consciousness. The condition for such 
breaking through is that one is on the level of sensible consciousness. In feeling partly 
free and dependent on the finite, the human being thus also feels absolutely 
dependent on God. The more he feels this way, the more pious he is (5.3/4).
The actual appearance of the feeling of absolute dependence (in its being joined 
with sensible self-consciousness) is described in general terms in the sixth paragraph, 
the final paragraph of the Lehnsätze from his Ethics. We receive God-consciousness 
                                               
     15 Schleiermacher sees the reality of human beings and nature as characterized by antitheses, 
such as receptivity and spontaneity, freedom and dependence, reason and nature, body and 
soul, etc. See F. Siegmund-Schulze, Schleiermachers Psychologie in ihrer Bedeutung für die 
Glaubenslehre (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1913), ch. 2.
1via revelation and the Church. The main thesis of paragraph six states that the 
religious communions originated necessarily out of pious self-consciousness.16 For 
this Schleiermacher appeals to the consciousness of the human being as a 
consciousness of kind. The human being is always human being in community, 
according to Schleiermacher in his Ethics (E1814/16), p. 455, note). The 
consciousness of kind begins with the recognition of others as human beings and this 
comes to expression in communication with others and taking up of their views into 
oneself (PS, p. 524). We therefore leave the limitation of our own personality and 
take up facts from others into ourselves. The feeling of absolute dependence is not 
only internal but is brought to expression by means “of facial expression, gesture, 
tones and (indirectly) words” and is thus perceptible to others (6.2; E1812/13, 212). 
Thus Schleiermacher describes the origin of religious communion from the pious 
consciousness.
In the same paragraph he emphasizes something else. Here the existence of the 
pious community is presupposed and leads in turn to the feeling of absolute 
dependence. Paragraph 6.2 thus ends as follows: “As regards the feeling of absolute 
dependence in particular, everyone will know that it was first awakened in him in the 
same way, by the communicative and stimulative power of expression or utterance” 
(cf. 10.2). In my view, this does not contradict the main thesis of this paragraph in any 
way. The main thesis emphasizes that (ontologically) a pious community is based on a 
revelation given by God to the pious consciousness, whereas the closing sentence of 
6.2 is concerned (ontically/historically) with the concrete, actual religious community. 
After all, Schleiermacher had previously spoken of the feeling of absolute 
dependence as an event of an original revelation of God in the human being (4.4). 
That receives more depth here by Schleiermacher's pointing out that it concerns an 
event within a historical community via the “revelation” of another human being.
In brief, Schleiermacher does not restrict himself to the feeling of absolute 
dependence as a religious a priori. He is concerned with piety as it actually appears. 
What is said in general in paragraphs five and six about the actual appearance of 
religion is made concrete in the following paragraphs for the history of religion (7-10) 
and for Christianity (11-14). The feeling of absolute dependence does not define 
religion but is the defining characteristic that makes a certain experience a religious 
experience or a certain phenomenon a religious phenomenon. Schleiermacher's 
generic view of religion is historical and dynamic. It does not say that every person is 
religious but that the human being is potentially religious and the mature person 
should realize that potential. Religiosity is present in humans in grades, depending on 
the religious community of which she or he is a part.
The feeling of absolute dependence is the essence of piety. It is the universal, the 
                                               
     16 “The religious self-consciousness, like every essential element in human nature, leads 
necessarily in its development to fellowship or communion ...” (6).
1generic element of 1) the religiosity of human beings and 2) the actual historical 
religions. This raises questions in connection with our topic. Does the generic view of 
religion entail that those indifferent to religion also display this feeling of absolute 
dependence but then deny it or do not recognize it? And what are we to do with the 
adherents of non-monotheistic religions? Do they also have that feeling of absolute 
dependence or God-consciousness? Is the feeling of absolute dependence a criterion 
for distinguishing between true and false religions?
I will first discuss God-consciousness and the non-monotheistic religions and 
then the generic view of religion and the phenomenon of indifference to religion.
2.2. The Feelig of Absolute Dependence
and the Non-monotheistic Religions
In the Lehnsätze from the philosophy of religion (7-10) Schleiermacher describes the 
differences between religions in order to determine the place of Christianity. The 
feeling of absolute dependence is the defining characteristic of religion. How does he 
relate the universal, the feeling of absolute dependence, and the particular/actual to 
each other? Does the feeling of absolute dependence function here as a criterion for 
true religion or as an ordering principle for describing the religions? In the first 
option, the feeling of absolute dependence would function as an a priori measure for 
determining the truth of the religions. In this way in philosophy of religion an 
argument could be made for the truth of Christianity. The thesis that human beings 
are religious by nature, however, is just as difficult to defend if one views religion from 
the perspective of the Christian religion. The second option is more concerned with a 
question of understanding, a phenomenological description of religion. This 
distinction does not say everything, however, for an ordering principle can also 
include a theological assessment and this can have consequences for the thesis that 
human beings are religious by nature.
As we will see, Schleiermacher discusses the distinction between true and false 
religion (7.3). Nonetheless, he is concerned (so I hold with Welker and Offerman, 
contra Flückiger) not with an a priori measure for distinguishing between true and 
false religions but rather with a description of the historically given forms of faith.17
The following reasons may be adduced for this:
1. In the prolegomena to The Christian Faith Schleiermacher sees philosophy of 
religion not as a normative discipline concerned with the question of truth but as a 
‘critical' historical science aimed at describing the different pious communities (2.2; 
                                               
     17 K.E. Welker, Die grundsätzliche Beurteilung der Religonsgeschichte durch 
Schleiermacher (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), passim; D. Offermann, Schleiermachers Einleitung 
in die Glaubenslehre (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969), pp. 139-234; F. Flückiger, Philosophie und 
Theologie bei Schleiermacher (Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG, 1947), pp. 42-48.
1KD23; E1812/13 III, 231).18 The Lehnsätze from his Ethics give, as we have seen, 
the general essential element of piety, the feeling of absolute dependence. On the 
basis of this the Lehnsätze from the philosophy of religion give a description of the 
different forms of the religious communities (2. Postscript 2; 11.5; KD23). If 
Schleiermacher calls philosophy of religion a “critical discipline” as a branch of 
historical science, this stems from the fact that he derives the concept of church (and 
religion) from ethics (2.2).
2. What is characteristic for an empirical community like the Christian community 
can never be understood nor deduced purely scientifically: “For no science can by 
means of mere ideas reach and elicit what is individual, but must always stop short 
with what is general” (2.2; KD32). Therefore, Schleiermacher rejects any a priori
construction in the area of history. It is thus impossible that the feeling of absolute 
dependence serves as a measure, for the universal cannot attain the individual form of 
religion.19 One finds this idea already in Über die Religion: “[B]ut in order to 
penetrate to the characteristic of the separate individual, one must abandon the 
universal concept with its properties” (256).
Schleiermacher's position therefore differs from that of the deists and rationalists 
of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment concept of natural religion, after all, 
functioned as a criterion for true religion, with the consequence that the differences -
what was unique in the positive religions - were reduced to the universal.20
3. In comparison with the Christian theologians during the time of the Enlightenment 
Schleiermacher gives a new view of the relation of the universal and the particular. It 
was usual with the Anglican apologists and the German neologists to see the 
particular, the unique aspect of a positive religion, as a supplementation of the 
universal, natural religion. The objection to this presentation of the matter is that the 
particular of a specific religion is seen as a supplement of the universal that is identical 
for all religions, such as belief in God. It was not that the differences between the 
religions were despised, but they were viewed as secondary in relation to the universal.
In paragraph ten Schleiermacher specifies the relation between the universal and 
the particular in an entirely different way. He does state that the feeling of absolute 
dependence is continually identical to itself and that difference arises through its being 
joined with a sensible consciousness (5.4), but this is not to be viewed in the sense of 
supplementation. Both the universal and the particular determine the individual 
                                               
     18 “By Philosophy of Religion is understood a critical presentation of the different existing 
forms of religious communion, as constituting, when taken collectively, the complete 
phenomenon of piety in human nature” (2.3).  
     19 As Offerman, Schleiermachers Einleitung, correctly notes, pp. 142f.
     20 W. Stoker, De christelijke godsdienst in de filosofie van de Verlichting, een vergelijkende 
studie over de geloofsverantwoording in het denken van Locke, de deïsten, Lessing en Kant
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1980), ch. 2.    
1shape of a religion. In the discussion of the monotheistic religions he remarks that 
“the same thing is present in all, but present in a quite different way in each” (10.2). It 
is not that these religions share belief in one God to which obedience to the law is 
added in Judaism, in Christianity faith in Jesus Christ or in Islam belief in the 
prophet. As far as Christianity is concerned, the belief in Jesus Christ has a decisive 
influence on the God-consciousness. Christianity is essentially determined by the 
redemption through Jesus of Nazareth (11). In every particular pious community the 
self-consciousness is therefore always differently determined (10.2; 32.3). Thus the 
individual form of a religion is guaranteed. In this connection Schleiermacher refers 
to an analogy with the human individual in his relation to the human species: “every 
man has in him all that another man has, but it is all differently determined” (10.3).
We can establish that the essence of religion is not determined here in a 
supratemporal way but that it unfolds in the historical, concrete religion. This is 
expressed in a second ordering principle alongside the feeling of absolute 
dependence. In paragraph nine the religions are ordered according to the way in 
which the feeling of absolute dependence is joined with a certain type of sensible self-
consciousness (cf. 5). The religions are described phenomenologically by means of 
the two positions of the sensible self-consciousness that are diametrically opposed. On 
the one hand, there are the “teleological” forms of piety which in relation to the pious 
affections subordinate the natural to the moral and on the other the “aesthetic” where 
the opposite is the case.21 In the first all the emphasis is on the activity of the self-
consciousness in its coherence with the feeling of absolute dependence, as in Judaism 
(because of its accent on ethics) and in Christianity (because of the devotion to the 
Kingdom of God), whereas in the second all accent lies on receptivity as in Islam (for 
which Schleiermacher referred to its fatalistic inclination) and, on another level of 
development, Hellenistic polytheism (9.1/2).
Of primary importance for our topic is that other ordering principle, the feeling 
of absolute dependence or, better, monotheism (8). We already stated that it does not 
function as a measure for true religion. Let us see how it functions as an ordering 
principle. Here an assessment based on Christian theology appears very much to play 
a decisive role.22
Schleiermacher does not speak only of different levels of development and 
about kinds of pious communities (7; 9). He also introduces a hierarchical order: 
“Those forms of piety in which all religious affections express the dependence of 
everything finite upon one Supreme and Infinite Being, i.e. the monotheistic forms, 
occupy the highest level; and all others are related to them as subordinate forms, from 
                                               
     21 “The widest diversity between forms of piety is that which exists, with respect to the 
religious affections, between those forms which subordinate the natural in human conditions to 
the moral and those which, on the contrary, subordinate the moral to the natural” (9).    
     22 In my view, Offerman does not emphasize this enough.
1which men are destined to pass to those higher ones” (8). The highest level consists of 
monotheism as that takes concrete form in a specific religious community.23 All other 
forms of piety, such as fetishism24 and polytheism, are subordinated to this. The 
intention here is that they develop into the higher forms. The starting point is 
monotheism, on the basis of which the lower forms are described. Schleiermacher 
remarks in connection with this: “supplementation [Ausfüllung] from above through 
comparison with monotheism” (German text, p. 51b). In addition, Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam are critically assessed with respect to the extent to which they 
have been influenced by fetishism or polytheism. Schleiermacher concludes that 
Christianity is “the most perfect of the most highly developed forms of religion” (8.4). 
This remark contrasts sharply with the phenomenological description of what is 
unique to these three religions in 9.2. And he had also previously warned his readers 
that the recognition of other forms of piety on the same level of development did not 
have to be in contradiction with the Christian belief in the exclusive excellence of 
Christianity (7.3).
We can ascertain that monotheism is not a normative concept in the sense that it, as a 
constant, erases the differences between the religions. It is a principle that arranges the 
religions according to different levels of which monotheism is the highest. In this a 
theological—or, more broadly, the general Western—assessment of the nineteenth 
century on its own religion plays a role.
Thus a problem seems to arise with the statement that the human being is 
religious, i.e has a feeling of absolute dependence or God-consciousness. In the 
preceding discussion it was stated that Schleiermacher held that there are grades of 
piety in the individual, according to the extent to which the feeling of absolute 
dependence works unhindered in him or her. At issue here are religious phenomena 
such as fetishism and polytheism where the feeling of absolute dependence has not 
entirely broken through in the adherents of these religions. Should we conclude that, 
according to Schleiermacher, one cannot speak of religion in these instances, because 
they lack what, in his view, is the defining feature of religion?
I would explain Schleiermacher's thesis that human beings are religious in a 
broader sense by interpreting it as the direction towards. This explanation is 
supported by a suggestion made by Schleiermacher himself (33.2) and by his doctrine 
of truth. True and false religions do not stand over against each other as true over 
against untrue. According to Schleiermacher, in line with Romans 1:21 false religions 
                                               
     23 The monotheistic form of faith is presented as “believing in one God on whom the 
religious man regards himself as being (along with the world of which he is a part) absolutely 
dependent” (8.2).
     24 This is described as worshipping the “particular idols which belong to the family or the 
locality or the particular occupation in which [someone] lives” (8.2).    
1also have an idea of the truth. He works with the maxim that error does not have an 
independent existence but always depends on that which is true. Error can be 
understood only in connection with the truth and the ‘true' with which it is connected 
(7.3; DO334). Thus Schleiermacher does recognize the lower forms of religiosity very 
much as piety, even though their adherents lack God-consciousness in the strict sense. 
Of fetishism he remarks that the higher and lower forms of self-consciousness are so 
little distinguished from each other that the feeling of absolute dependence is still too 
much influenced by the object of worship in question (8.2). Partial and absolute 
dependence are not yet distinguished in fetishism. The same obtains for polytheism: 
the feeling of absolute dependence does not appear here in its full unity and non-
differentiation over against everything that is claimed in the sensible self-
consciousness. The feeling of absolute dependence as a universal consciousness of 
finitude has not yet been realized (8.2). We can understand why Schleiermacher 
remarks that, with such a form of piety individuals are destined to move towards a 
monotheistic form of religion (8).
In brief, although the feeling of absolute dependence is the defining 
characteristic of religion, this is not to say that he denies that non-monotheistic 
religions are religions. The feeling of absolute dependence can be explained in a 
broad sense so that adherents of non-monotheistic religions also fall under the 
direction towards. This expresses an assessment of non-monotheistic religions based 
on Christian theology. Non-monotheistic religions do indeed have their place in the 
history of religion, according to Schleiermacher, but monotheism is the “highest 
level” (8). However, the feeling of absolute dependence, derived from the Christian 
experience of faith of being created by God, is too limited to function as the defining 
characteristic of religion. The thesis that the human being is by nature religious is 
implausible. In actuality, it means that the human should become religious (in the 
sense of acquiring the feeling of absolute dependence).
2.3. The Generic View of Religion
and Indifference to Religion
Schleiermacher recognizes that there are facts that argue against his view that human 
beings are religious. One could object, for instance, that for the individual there is a 
time in which the feeling of absolute dependence is not yet present. Schleiermacher 
fends off this objection, however, because this is the period of the incompleteness of 
life, as can be seen partly from the animal confusion of consciousness that still reigns 
and partly from the slowly emerging development of vital functions (6.1). The same 
obtains for the objection that there are societies—we already encountered them—in 
which this feeling has still not been awakened. That is also a matter of the 
undeveloped state of human nature that can also be discovered in their other vital 
functions (6.1). 
1A decrease in religiosity and the decline in the number of adherents to the 
official religion would not, for Schleiermacher, finally count against his generic view of 
religion, as can be seen from the way in which he responds to the indifference of 
people to religion in his own society. He holds that such people must recognize that 
religion is not alien to them and that at certain moments they experience the feeling 
of absolute dependence, even though they use other terms for it (6.1; 11.2). 
Elsewhere he discusses atheism in its different forms. One of these forms is 
licentiousness and is stamped as “a sickness of the soul” (33.2). Another form he 
explains on the basis of the struggle against incorrect presentations by Christian 
theology of the pious consciousness, as in the eighteenth century the tyranny of the 
Church evoked a struggle by atheists against doctrine (33.2).
Religion can be seen as something accidental or coincidental only if, according to 
Schleiermacher, one can show that the feeling of absolute dependence has no higher 
value than other non-religious feelings or that there is something that is equal in value 
to the feeling of absolute dependence. If that is so, the feeling of absolute dependence 
does not belong to the “complete human nature for everybody” (6.1). As stated, 
Schleiermacher believes that the opposite is the case.
If we can explain non-monotheistic religions as orientations towards God-
consciousness, this is less possible with respect to conscious choices for indifference 
to religion. Schleiermacher calls the relatedness of the sensible consciousness to the 
higher self-consciousness, the feeling of absolute dependence, “the consummating 
point of the self-consciousness” (5.3. italics mine). This entails that religion belongs to 
human maturity. Schleiermacher's position over against unbelief corresponds to the 
thesis of the Dutch psychiatrist H.C. Rümke who saw unbelief as a disturbance in the 
development of the person.25
Schleiermacher formulates his generic view of religion in the society of his time. The 
two objections that I will now cite are in themselves separate from a certain cultural 
situation but weigh heavily in the current pluralistic, secular culture:
1. the feeling of absolute dependence is too limited to serve as a general denominator 
for religions, as proved to be the case in our discussion of non-monotheistic religions.
2. In this conception of a generic view of religion those who are indifferent to religion 
cannot be equal partners in discussion and this is equally true with respect to the 
strongly growing secular worldviews after Schleiermacher. A hidden/unconscious 
understanding of God is ascribed to those who are indifferent to religion. The debate 
is thus decided before it even begins.26
                                               
     25 H.C. Rümke, Karakter en aanleg in verband met het ongeloof (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 
1963).
     26 In a discussion on my article, D.Z. Phillips (Swansea/Claremont) rightly remarked that 
critics of religion such as Freud and Marx can also accompany their critique of religion with a 
1Is the generic view of religion convincing enough to indicate in a pluralistic 
culture that religion is not something coincidental or accidental to society? We will 
explore whether these two objections to this generic view of religion can be met. If 
not, then I, who share Schleiermacher's view that religion is not a marginal 
phenomenon, must attempt to realize his intention in a different way.
3. A Generic View of Religion
and our Contemporary Secular Culture
In the twentieth century there have also been theologians like Paul Tillich and 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith who, like Schleiermacher, defend the thesis that religion is 
not accidental or coincidental by means of a generic view of religion.27 Their generic 
conception of religion is important for us because they have developed this 
conception precisely in the contemporary context of a pluralistic, secular society. Our 
main purpose in looking at them is to see if they can avoid both of the above 
objections to a generic view of religion.
3.1. ‘Faith' Instead of 
the Feeling of Absolute Dependence
Over against a secular view of life that considers religion to be accidental or even a 
waste product, Wilfred Cantwell Smith defends the view that ‘faith' is univerally 
human (FB, 135f., 139).28 His distinction between faith and cumulative tradition is 
well-known. On the one hand, there is faith, the relation with the divine 
transcendence, and, on the other, the expression of this in rites, prayer, dance and 
doctrine. Faith is universally human, but there are also the actual historical religions. 
The relation between universal and particular is not that of the Enlightenment model 
of the supplementation of the universal by the particular. The universal, as in 
Schleiermacher, is joined with the particular as its core. Faith interacts with the 
cumulative tradition. There is thus nothing of a uniform faith of human beings who 
belong to different traditions (MER 190). The kind of faith one has is contingent but 
having faith is a constant (FB 138).
Faith characterizes the human being as homo religiosus. It is “the essential 
                                                                                                                                  
generic claim: religion in general is a matter of projection or social alienation. Here too the 
debate is decided before it even begins.
     27 Defenses of a generic view of religion can also be found in Wolfhart Pannenberg, Mircea 
Eliade and in Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner and Gerhard Oberhammer.
     28 I will refer to the following works by Smith: The Meaning and End of Religion (London: 
SPCK, 1978) (= MER), Faith and Belief, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) (= FB); 
Towards a World Theology (London/Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd) (= TWT).
1human quality: that is constitutive of man as human; that personality is constituted by 
our universal ability, or invitation, to live in terms of a transcendent dimension, and in 
response to it” (FB 129). It is “generically human” (FB 135; TWT 146, 171, 181). 
This is not intended in an abstract and static sense—one can, after all, not separate 
faith from the forms in which it appears. Like Schleiermacher, Smith also views the 
thesis the human being is religious in an historical dynamic sense (FB 138). Faith is 
not ‘natural' and certainly not automatic: “Faith is normal: but to abnormality man is 
naturally prone” (FB 141). For that reason it is necessary that one be raised within a 
specific religious community (MER 189; cf. TWT 138).
Does this generic view of religion, of faith, do more justice to the non-monotheistic 
religions than the feeling of absolute dependence? Sometimes Smith speaks of the 
transcendent reality of God but sometimes in a broader sense. Faith is also expressed, 
for example, in the Theravadin Buddhist tradition, where an ultimate reality like 
dharma is itself a transcendent pattern of correct behaviour “so that even the 
intellectual expression of faith, let alone the practical, is in ethical terms” (MER 179).
If we view faith as the relation of the individual with divine transcendence, 
leaving open the question as to whether it is personal or impersonal,  one or many, 
moral or non-moral, gracious or demanding,29 then the objection that the generic 
element does not do any justice to non-monotheistic religions has been met. Faith is 
unmistakably broader than the feeling of absolute dependence. It is an open 
description of “everything that a tradition means to an insider.”30
Has the second objection, i.e. that a generic conception of religion does not do 
justice to secular worldviews, also been met? Smith is unclear on this question. He 
sees the “alienated nihilism” as the opposite of faith (FB 134f.). Smith is vague 
regarding the contemporary humanism that is indifferent to religion. He holds that it 
is sufficient to see faith as belief “in reason and truth, in justice and in man” (FB 134). 
But if the term faith includes the (older and contemporary) humanism, it then 
receives another, not strictly religious meaning than is generally the case in Smith. 
Belief in reason, truth and justice can be understood as being implicitly religious by 
means of a transcendental philosophy in the spirit of Tillich but we find nothing of 
this in Faith and Belief. P. Slater even holds that in Smith faith is broader yet and to 
be understood as a term for a cosmic basic trust.31 Interpreted in this way every 
human being (with the exception of certain forms of nihilism) is certainly religious. 
But then the term faith (in Smith a strictly religious term for the most part) has been 
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     30 H.M. Vroom, Religions and the Truth: Philosophical Reflections and Perspectives (Grand 
Rapids/Amsterdam: Eerdmans/Rodopi), p. 76.
     31  P. Slater et al., “Three responses to Faith and Belief: a Review Article,” Sciences 
Religieuses/Studies in Religion 10 (1981): 113.
1stretched to a great extent.
3.2 Are Secular Worldviews Quasi-Religions?
Paul Tillich attempts to meet not only the first objection but particularly the second.32
He replaces the feeling of absolute dependence by the term “ultimate concern.” 
Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence is “only a slightly narrower way of 
saying ultimate concern” (HCT 401). Religion is being grasped by an ultimate 
concern. The reference to gods is lacking in this definition of religion, allowing it to 
include, for example, Zen Buddhism. But Tillich takes yet another step by also 
including secular worldviews. He thus comes to his distinction between authentic 
religions and quasi-religions (GW 5, 51f.).
The concept religion can take on such a broad meaning if we understand 
religion as being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern that makes all others 
purely transient and in itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of our 
lives. Such a concern has the character of an unconditional seriousness and it 
demands that every finite concern that comes into conflict with the infinite must yield. 
In the theistic religions that is God or a higher principle such as Brahman. In secular 
quasi-religions such as nationalism and humanism the nation and human beings, 
respectively, have that role. The term quasi-religions indicates that secular worldviews 
have an unintended actual correspondence with authentic religions that can be seen. 
They are distinguished from pseudo-religions which have an intended and professed 
correspondence with authentic religion (GW 5, 53).
J.E. Smith, in his Quasi-Religions, describes secular worldviews like humanism, 
Marxism and nationalism by means of Tillich's generic view of religion.33 He 
emphasizes the difference between the quasi-religions and the authentic religions: in 
the former the finite is absolutized. Nevertheless, they have something in common 
with authentic religion in that they function in a similar way. Smith investigates the 
world religions and concludes that they all show a general pattern: 1) a diagnosis of 
the human situation on the basis of the religious ultimate, which indicates the nature 
of the evil that separates us from the religious ultimate and 2) the quest for a liberator 
who restores the breach (QR 3). He subsequently shows that this same pattern is 
present in nationalism, Marxism and humanism. In addition, they have an ultimate 
                                               
     32 I will cite from the following works: “Das Christentum und die Begegnung der 
Weltreligionen,” Gesammelte Werke, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1964), pp. 
51f. (= GW); A History of Christian Thought, ed. C.E. Braaten (New York: Simon and 
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     33 J.E. Smith, Quasi-Religions (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1994) (= QR).
1concern, albeit something finite that has been absolutized for this purpose. The 
universally constant in quasi and authentic religions is their function of granting 
liberation.
Tillich and J.E. Smith seem to succeed in meeting both objections. They make 
the generic conception of religion fruitful in confrontation with secular worldviews. In 
any case, a basis for dialogue has been established through the establishment of a 
corresponding function: the granting of liberation. Religion is taken in so broad a 
sense that it merges with the quest for and reception of an answer to the meaning of 
life (GW 5, 52). In that sense one can claim that religion is a generic concept: even 
those indifferent to religion (in the strict sense) are ‘religious' in their desire for 
meaning. The secular worldviews are a source of meaning and therefore belong to the 
genus religion. They have the same function as the authentic religions.
But what is the price? Their solution is not convincing for the following reasons:
1. The general pattern to which J.E. Smith refers is too vague and thus the term 
religion loses its specific content. It could also include the diet of the dietitian. Health 
is, after all, an ultimate value for some.
2. Here one has moved from a substantial definition to a functional definition. As a 
rule, Tillich views his definition of religion, being grasped by an ultimate concern, as a 
substantial one, as referring to another decisive reality that rejects the absolutization of 
something finite. This is one of Tillich's fundamental motivations, the so-called 
Protestant principle. Viewing secular worldviews as a type of religion can succeed only 
by way of an inconsistency: the substantial definition changes into a functional one. 
Secular worldviews can only be called (quasi-)religions because of their function, not 
because of their content.
3. There is a contradiction in Tillich's theology. In a closer analysis of what Tillich 
understands by religion, the defining characteristic of religion appears to be the 
principle of identity: the union of God and human beings.34 He thus points out that 
Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence, just like his own ultimate concern, 
falls outside the subject-object schema (HCT 404f.). And that cannot happen if one's 
ultimate concern is something finite, as Tillich allows through his description of quasi-
religions as “being grasped by the ultimate concern.”
4. Like Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Schleiermacher, Tillich wants, with his generic 
conception of religion, to show that religion is an independent, irreducible 
phenomenon in distinction from other phenomena like art and science. As far his 
own position is concerned, he rejects reductionism. Nevertheless, Tillich and J.E. 
Smith engage in reductionism, from the point of view of the adherents of secular 
worldviews, by characterizing these worldviews as quasi-religions. The humanist P. 
Kurtz calls such a definition of religion applied to humanism a “definition by 
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1conversion.”35
In brief, Schleiermacher's generic view of religion can possibly be broadened by 
terms such as faith or ultimate concern with respect to non-monotheistic religions. 
The objection that a generic view of religion does little or no justice to the fact that 
many people and worldviews are indifferent to religion (in the strict sense of the word) 
remains. Either they are reduced to a form of (albeit often wrong) religiosity or 
religion (Tillich and J.E. Smith) or labelled as nihilistic or nihilism, a tendency in 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith (FB 134f.). I therefore consider a generic concept of religion 
to be of little use for the contemporary secular culture in which we have to deal with 
people and worldviews like contemporary humanism that are indifferent to religion.
4. Worldview as the Generic Element
in Contemporary Secular Culture
and the Justification of Religion
With Schleiermacher I hold that religion is an irreducible given and not merely a 
coincidence. If a generic conception of religion carries little conviction in a secular 
culture, how can one show that religion is not a marginal concern? In this we need 
both to be attentive to the above discussion as well as to recognize secular worldviews 
for what they are. Schleiermacher, in my view, was right in seeking a generic element. 
In the interest of peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic society one needs, however, to 
seek a generic element to which all people, religious or secular, can agree. I will make 
the following proposal in two steps: the first concerns the generic element and the 
second a small indication of the direction in which I would seek the further 
justification of religion.
4.1. Worldview as the Generic Element
It is not religion but the idea of worldview that is given with human existence. 
According to Heidegger, it is, among other things, the task of philosophy to show that 
“something like a worldview belongs to the essence of human existence.”36 This is a 
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1statement on the ontological rather than the ontic level. It does not concern indicating 
a specific, concrete worldview but an understanding of human existence to which a 
worldview as such belongs. It concerns understanding (human) reality prior to all 
experience of reality.37
For human existence orientation is necessary. That is what the term 
“understanding” points to in Heidegger's Being and Time. Understanding is to be 
viewed as characteristic for the human way of existence. All understanding is 
“understanding as.” Understanding is possible because the things do not appear in 
insolation but stand in a referential totality. Our human existence as a being-in-the-
world means that the relation between humans and the world is internal. In 
connection with this the concept worldview can be seen as an ontological or 
anthropological category.38 It expresses the integrating and unifying character of our 
experience.
Worldview as an anthropological category shows itself in the communal 
character of human existence. It is the frame of orientation that has been passed on 
and taken over and therewith the presupposition of our being acquainted with the 
world. Worldliness, historicity and language are the ontological forms that are 
constitutive for the human life-world. These structures are always filled in by one or 
another worldview.
This indicates only indirectly that religion and secular worldviews are not something 
accidental for society. As an anthropological category, worldview appears concretely 
as secular or religious worldviews. I do not wish to suggest that it is a matter of 
indifference as to whether one has a religious or a secular worldview.39 One should 
not conclude on the basis of the rejection of the generic view of religion that religion 
is thereby accidental or coincidental to human life. Therefore, by way of conclusion I 
will say something about a (further) justification of religion. That was, after all, the 
framework in which Schleiermacher presented his generic view of religion.
4.2. A Programme for the Justification of Religion
I will only indicate the direction in which I would look for a justification of religion. It 
has the character of a programme. I will indicate this direction in connection with 
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1Schleiermacher.
1. Over against those who reject an ultimate dimension (apart from the question of 
how to describe this more specifically) it can be philosophically established that there 
is such a transcendent dimension. Kant did this, in my view, convincingly in his 
Critique of Pure Reason.40 How the ultimate dimension should be interpreted is a 
matter for further discussion.
2. In his Dialektik Schleiermacher shows how immediate self-consciousness or feeling 
precedes Knowing and Doing. Religion is rooted in this pre-reflective sphere of 
human existence. By viewing religion primarily as piety, as a determination of the 
immediate self-consciousness, he breaks with the intellectualization of religion by 
many in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. This has consequences for the 
justification of Christian faith.
3. Faith as the feeling of absolute dependence is fundamental. It arises from preaching 
(CF 14.3) through “experience as the demonstration of the Spirit and of power” (CF 
14. Postscript). Schleiermacher seems to be referring here to Lessing's Über den 
Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft.41 He begins with his experience of Christian faith 
that is different from what it was for Lessing, no longer consisting in “necessary truths 
of reason” but rather in a proposal for the meaning of life. Schleiermacher thus does 
not want to call the ‘prolegomena' to The Christian Faith a foundation of faith.42 It is 
more modest to call it a justification, for the reality of the Christian faith is 
presupposed in the ‘prolegomena' to the Christian faith.
4. A justification of faith following Schleiermacher consists in the explication of the 
rationality of the faith experience. This has been called the view of rationality in life 
philosophy (Philosophie des Lebens). Here it concerns a form of understanding in 
which time, fact and individuality play constitutive roles. With T. de Boer I hold that 
“after the crisis of reason as the source of eternal truths every experience has an equal 
right in a philosophy that is searching for the meaning of our actual, historical 
existence.”43 A narrative theology could supplement Schleiermacher's theology of 
experience.
5. For a peaceful coexistence between people with different worldviews, mutual 
dialogue is indispensable. It is precisely Schleiermacher who has philosophically 
defended the indispensability of dialogue. The concept of “immediate self-
consciousness” brings with it, namely, the notion of dialogical reason. The subject 
does not ground itself nor is it comprehensible to itself. It cannot, as in Fichte, give 
knowledge of reality in a deductive way. As individuality, the finite subject is referred 
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     41 Aldus C. Senft, Wahrhaftigkeit und Wahrheit (Tübingen, 1956), p. 29.
     42 “Zweites Sendschreiben an Herrn Dr. Lücke,” Schleiermacher-Auswahl, 
Munich/Hamburg: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag), pp. 163ff.   
     43 T. de Boer, Langs de gewesten van het z_n (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 1996), p. 70.
1for knowledge to historical reality. Thus people have their religion or secular 
worldview passed on by traditions or, more generally, by the culture of their time and 
give their own form to it.
Christian faith is a proposal for the meaning of life that, in dialogue with other 
religions and secular worldviews, needs to be investigated with respect to its tenability.
